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This case study is intended to provide an overview of
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International arm sales have become one of the fastest
growing global enterprises. Arms sales in the past five
years have equaled all world-wide arms sales trade during
the preceding quarter century. Currently, the United States
is the leading supplier of arms to the world counting for
nearly as many arms exports as all other suppliers combined
[Ref. l:p. 1].
Offsets, and co-production, are quickly becoming common
words in the realm of the arms trade negotiations. These
compensatory trade agreements incorporate some method of
reducing the amount of foreign exchange needed to buy a
military item or some means of creating revenue to help pay
for it. According to a Department of Defense (DOD) 1983
report, within the next five years about $30 billion in
potential U.S. arms sales are expected to involve offsets
[Ref. 2:p. 2]. These offsets are designed to improve the
economic and industrial position of the receiving country.
As the volume and variety of these trade agreements
increase, so does the concern of many people in government
agencies, private industries and labor organizations. This
study seeks to identify the offset concessions made and
determine the effect of these arrangements on the U.S. Navy
F/A-18 Strike Fighter program.
The research was not simple, nor did all of the findings
result in satisfying precise answers. Still, the effort was
be made in order to better understand the effects of the
trade offsets on U.S. military programs and to provide
justification for continuing this potentially cost-effective
program during times of shrinking, real defense budgets.
B. OBJECTIVES
To properly evaluate the impact trade offsets agreements
have had on the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program the following
objectives are identified:
1. Define trade offsets and explain their evolution.
2. Determine what the Department of Defense and the U.S.
National policy is concerning offsets.
3. Identify specifically the offset arrangements and






What impact have trade offsets agreements had on the
F/A-18 strike fighter program?
2 Subsidiary Questions
What are trade offsets and why were they
established?
What is DOD policy concerning these offsets?
What are the specific costs and benefits of offsets
in the F/A-18 program?




The scope of this study is largely defined by the
primary research question—that is: determine the impact
that offset agreements have had on the domestic F/A-18
Strike Fighter program. Additionally, this thesis is
intended to provide an overview of trade offsets and to






Using the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program as a case
study the research will be limited to program management
issues impacted by these offset arrangements.
3 Assumptions
The FMS program exists in a regulatory environment
which governs the nature and impact of trade offsets. The
validity of the findings and conclusions of this study
depends on the absence of significant change in current





The research methodology for this thesis included a
review of current literature including trade journals,
periodicals, previous research reports, congressional
testimony, applicable DOD instructions and directives.
Personal interviews of individuals associated with FMS
offsets at the office of Secretary of Defense, the F/A-18
Program Office, and personnel at the Manufacturing Co-
Production Program Office at the McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft
Company (MCAIR) were conducted.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Offsets have become a major contract item in awarding
military contracts by foreign governments.
2
.
The range and magnitude of reguired offsets have
increased in the last five years.
3. The nature of offsets demanded has increasingly tended
toward arrangements which include technology transfer
and management assistance.
4. DOD policy on offsets is to not become involved in
guaranteeing offsets and to not finance direct
offsets.
5. The offset agreements used with the sale of the F/A-18
has no serious impact on the program or the U.S.
economy.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter is devoted to explaining the offset
phenomenon. The information provided will help the reader
to better understand the analysis and conclusions of this
thesis through knowledge of the terminology and policies of
these offset arrangements. The discussion begins with a
definition of offsets, and proceeds to a quick review of the
offset elements. Next the chapter presents data on the
magnitude of offsets and then concludes with a brief history
of DOD's policy concerning offsets.
A. DEFINING OFFSETS
Unfortunately, the concept of offsets lacks uniform
definition, and a variety of terms are used by different
government and business entities to describe the phenomenon.
This study uses the term "offsets" to refer to trade
arrangements. These trade arrangements include a variety of
compensation practices required by a foreign purchasing
government as a condition attached to the sale of defense
articles or services. These arrangements are intended to
reduce the impact of expensive weapon systems on the buyer's
balance of payments, or to provide the buyer with other
advantages such as: increased employment, expansion of the
industrial base, and enhancement of technology transfer.
Although the terms of the offset on individual contracts
may vary, and a contract may call for one or more than one
kind, offsets can generally be grouped into one of the
following types: [Ref. 3:pp. 185-187]
Co-Production—Co-production is overseas production
arrangements made between governments that permit a foreign
government or producer to acquire the technical information
and "know how" to manufacture all or part of U.S. defense
equipment. This includes government to government licensed
production. It excludes licensed production based upon
direct commercial arrangements by U.S. manufacturers.
Licensed Production—Licensed Production involves
overseas production of U.S. defense equipment based upon
transfer of technical information under direct commercial
arrangements between a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign
government or producer.
Subcontractor Production—Subcontractor Production
includes overseas production of a part or sub-assembly of
U.S. equipment. The sub-contract doesn't include license of
technical information or "know how" and is usually a direct
commercial arrangement between a U.S. manufacturer and a
foreign government or producer.
Overseas Investment—Overseas Investment involves
investment coming from the offset agreement. It can take
the form of capital invested to establish or expand a
subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign country.
Technology Transfer (other than licensed production and
co-production)—Transfer of technology may take the form of:
- research and development being conducted abroad,
- technical assistance being provided to the subsidiary or
joint venture of overseas investment,
- other activities under direct commercial arrangement
between the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign entity.
Countertrade—Countertrade involves the purchase of goods
and services from the buying country as a condition of the
offset agreement. These reciprocal purchases of civil or
defense items may be purchased by the U.S. government or by
the U.S. contractor.
Table 1 outlines the most common military offsets.
Offsets can be further divided into two main categories:
direct and indirect.
Direct Offset—Direct Offsets include any business that
relates directly to the product being sold. An example is
the Israel purchase of the F-16 which allows an Israeli
contractor to produce the aircraft's composite rudder.
Indirect Offsets—Indirect Offsets are associated with
goods or services unrelated to the item being sold. The
supplier agrees to use its "best efforts" to purchase a
certain dollar amount of the buyer's manufactured products,
raw materials or services as a condition of the sale. For
example, McDonnell Douglas agreed to use its "best effort"
to purchase $100 million of Israeli goods over a 10 year
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These "best effort" agreements are normally the case in
these reciprocal purchase agreements.
B. OFFSETS FROM TWO DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
From industry's perspective it is preferable to sell
outright with no obligations to: share production; transfer
technology; or commit to make purchases from a buyer.
However, research shows that U.S. contractors are willing to
enter into offset agreements because they are considered
necessary to remain competitive. As one Sikorsky official
put it, "Sixty percent of something is better than 100% of
nothing." [Ref. 4:p. 64]
From a buyer's perspective, offsets are very attractive.
Offsets reduce the impact of expensive weapon systems,
provide valuable technology and production know how, expand
employment and create or sustain defense industries. There
are some drawbacks of offsets for the buyer; one being the
unit cost of a weapon system is usually higher. For
example, Japan, who has limited its defense spending to one
percent of its GNP, has been willing to spend two to three
times more to co-produce some defense items rather than buy
them off the shelf [Ref. 5:pp. 291-320].
According to the United States International Trade
Commission (ITC) , the selling company is normally aware of a
required offset prior to negotiations.
Generally, the only variables in the sales contract to be
negotiated are the share of the offset of the total
contract price, the specific products to be included,
scheduling of delivery and the overall time period to be
covered. [Ref. 6:p. 38]
If the seller does not accept the terms of the proposed
offsets, the sale may go to a competitor.
C. WHAT IS THE MAGNITUDE OF OFFSETS?
The U.S. Government has undertaken two major studies of
offsets. On 11 June 1984 the ITC began its Assessment of
Effects of Barter and Countertrade Transactions on U.S.
Industries. Concurrent with the ITC's investigation,
Congress enacted the Defense Production Act Amendments of
1984 (Public Law 98-265) which amended the Defense
Production Act of 1950. This law requires an annual report
to Congress regarding the impact of offsets on defense
preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and
the trade of the United States. The reporting requirement
was triggered by the sale of McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 to
Canada and the impact of that sale on U.S. defense
subcontractors [Ref. 7:p. 14].
Since the ITC was conducting an investigation very
similar in terms of data requirements, an agreement was
reached in November 1984 to combine data collection efforts
in the interests of reducing the demands of the private
sector. The ITC was designated as the lead and gathered the
necessary data for both studies.
The ITC received questionnaire data from 154 firms
having offset obligations resulting from military related
10
export sales. The following are the results of the study's
findings as they relate to the volume and nature of offsets
associated with military related exports.
The first measure of offset magnitude included total
military export sales of $47.8 billion during the survey
period of 1980-84. Additionally, offsets were associated
with almost half of the total military related export sales
—$22.5 billion of the 47.8 billion. Aerospace products
account for more than 80 percent of the reported value of
military export sales agreements.
Export sales agreements containing an offset agreement
were subject to significant year to year fluctuations. They
were at their highest level
—
$6.6 billion and 94 percent of
military sales in 1980, and at their lowest— $732 million
and 7 percent of sales in 1982. The fluctuation in the
value of sales were a reflection of the sporadic procurement
of major weapon systems by foreign governments. Detailed
data is in Table 2
.
The second and most significant measure of magnitude is
the amount of offset obligations incurred—$8.8 billion.
NATO-Europe accounted for more than half (4.6 billion) of
all reported offset obligations signed during 1980-84 while
Asian countries accounted for 20 percent. Offset
obligations with other countries (Australia and Canada)
accounted for the remaining 20 percent. See Table 3. Table













































COLLECTIVE VALUE OF OFFSET OBLIGATION, BY REGIONS
AND YEARS OFFSET AGREEMENTS WERE ENTER INTO, 19 8 0-84
(In Millions of Dollars)
Region 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-84
Europe:
NATO cty. 1 159 275 52 3,024 1,128 4,638
Non-NATO
cty 2 - 300 106 40 93 539
Subtotal 159 575 158 3,064 1,221 5,177
Asia 3 236 553 98 160 799 1,846
All others 4 15 1,423 183 20 162 1,803
Total 413 2,551 440 3,244 2,182 8,830
-^Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.
2 Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.
3 Israel, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Republic of Korea,
and Turkey.
4Mainly Australia and Canada.
Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add to the
totals shown.
Source: Compiled from data submitted in response to




FACE VALUE OF GOODS AND SERVICES THAT WERE OBLIGED IN
SATISFYING OFFSETS, BY TYPES OF OFFSET AND YEARS
OFFSET AGREEMENTS WERE ENTERED INTO, 1980-84
(In Millions of Dollars)
Type of Offset 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Direct:
Co-production 29 532 141 45 770








Technology transfer * 3 6 8
Technology transfer
and licensed prod. 5
Direct offsets but
not yet specified - 184 3 - 81






but not yet specified -
Total 14
— — 5 32
- 5 6 1
302 73 39 383
161 1 2,,448 159
463 78 2,,498 574
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)





actual amount 75 - -
Combination of
direct and








'Less than $0.5 million.
Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add to the
totals shown.
Source: Compiled from data submitted in response to
questionnaires of the U.S. International
Trade Commission.
12 3 — 3 45
_
_6 3 10 141
12 84 83 10 141
399 2,538 426 3,,215 2,144
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obligated in satisfying offsets, by types of offsets and by
the year offset agreements were entered.
The third measure of offset significance is the actual
fulfillment of the obligation. Since fulfillment may take
as long as 10 years to complete, it is not surprising that
slightly less than $3 billion of the $8.8 billion of
obligations have been fulfilled. More than half of the
offset fulfillment was in the aircraft and parts category
(see Tables 5 and 6)
.
TABLE 5
TOTAL FACE VALUE OF OFFSET OBLIGATIONS OF MORE THAN
$2 MILLION FULFILLED, BY REGIONS AND YEARS
CONTRACTS SIGNED, 1980-84
(In Millions of Dollars)
Region 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Europe:




2 23 30 54
Subtotal 62 165 175 235 435
Asia 49 31 45 80 262
All others 246 266 158 225 313




Fulfillment of the offset
obligation of $2 million or








In conclusion it appears, for the period 1980-84 that
offsets are increasingly being required as a prerequisite
for purchasing major defense equipment. Defense contractors
can continue to offer offset arrangements to enhance their
business activity or lose sales to competitors that offer
more attractive offset proposals.
D. WHAT IS THE CURRENT U.S. NATIONAL POLICY ON OFFSETS?
The U.S. policies on arms sales seem to be a reflection
of current political and economic factors, and as these
factors change so does our policy.
The Department of Defense has been an active player in
offset deals. In 1975, Switzerland purchased 72 F-5
fighters with $400 million; $120 million of guaranteed
countertrade offsets were part of this arrangement. James
R. Blaker, then Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for
17
Policy Analysis, explained to the House Economic
Stabilization subcommittee:
The department was placed in a strange position of
trying to help market Swiss produced electrical generators
— in effect being in competition with American producers.
The Department of Defense did not like this. [Ref. 8:p.
764]
The current U.S. policy was initiated in a memorandum
from then Deputy of Defense Secretary Charles W. Duncan Jr.
on 4 May 1978. The memorandum notes the increased frequency
of offset arrangements, designates management responsibility
for evaluating and monitoring such agreements within the DOD
and establishes the basic policy with respect to
compensatory co-production and offset agreements with other
nations. The memorandum states:
Because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating
and implementing compensatory co-production and offset
agreements, and the economic inefficiencies they often
entail, DOD shall not normally enter into such agreements.
An exception will be made only when there is no feasible
alternative to ensure the successful completion of
transactions considered to be of significant importance to
United States national security interests. . . . [Ref.
9:p. 1]
The same document specifies that when compensatory
agreements are necessary, they should:
- be as broad as possible to obtain maximum credit for
U.S. purchases of defense goods and services;
- avoid offset targets whether stated in percentage or
money terms;
- be used to reduce administrative barriers to defense
trade by all parties;
- encourage equal competition between U.S. and foreign
firms concerning bidding on contracts;
18
- specify that the burden of fulfilling any commitment
rest with the U.S. firms directly benefiting from the
sale.
Co-production is not prohibited by the Duncan
memorandum. The U.S. government is involved in negotiations
leading to granting permission for co-production by a
foreign country. However, the U.S. government does not
guarantee the purchase of defense products produced under
such an arrangement.
The second basic DOD policy with respect to offsets
involves the use of FMS credit funds to finance sales
involving direct offsets. DOD policy stipulates that direct
offsets will not be financed with FMS credit funds.
The most recent iteration of Defense Security Assistance
Agency's (DSAA) GUIDELINES FOR FMS LOAN FINANCING OF DIRECT
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS issued on October 9,1985 states that:
Loan financing is discouraged for purchases containing
offset provisions as a condition for securing the
purchase. Offset provisions are agreements by the seller
to make investments or procurement in a country other than
the U.S., either concurrent with or subsequent to the
purchase for which financing is being requested. No FMS
loan funds will be authorized or disbursed to pay for
mandatory direct offsets. Mandatory direct offsets are
procurement of a foreign-made component required by the
foreign government as a condition of sale, for
incorporation in a U.S. produced end item being sold.
While FMS loan funds will not be authorized for foreign
produced contract resulting from mandatory direct offsets
such funding can be authorized for the U.S. contract.
[Ref. 10 :p. 1]
The only exception to this policy is Israel. During FY
1985 in a policy determination intended to assist Israel's
industrial capability, the administration approved a $200
19
million level of FMS credit financing for direct offsets to
Israeli industries. In all other countries the financing of
any foreign production of components for, or final assembly
of, the item being purchased must be financed using the
government's own national resources.
To summarize, offsets are defined as a range of
industrial and commercial compensation practices required by
a purchasing government as a condition sale of defense
articles or services. These practices include:
countertrade, co-production, mandatory subcontracting,
overseas investment, technology transfer, or other
arrangements for the transfer of advanced production
processes and management shifts. The ITC study clearly
outlines several trends in foreign government policies:
Offsets have become and will continue to be a main
factor in awarding military contracts by foreign
governments
.
The range and magnitude of required offsets has increased
in the last five years.
The nature of offsets demanded has increasingly included
arrangements which involve technology transfer, production
and management assistance.
The Department of Defense's policy on offsets is to not
become involved in guaranteeing offsets and to not finance




This chapter begins with a short discussion of the FMS
bureaucratic process and a comparison with commercial sales.
The two most common methods used by foreign governments
to purchase US defense goods is by FMS or commercially. FMS
entails the American Government selling military hardware
directly to the foreign government. The commercial sale
(also referred to as direct sales) enables the purchaser to
buy directly from the manufacturer. Both types of
transactions must obtain U.S. Government (USG) approval and
both must follow Congressional notification procedures if
above thresholds specified by Arms Export Control Act of
1976 (AECA) . Highlights of the latest amendments to AECA,
which became effective in February 1986, require
Congressional notification when: 1) any Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) to sell defense articles or services for
$50 million or more, 2) any design or construction of
defense articles for $20 million or more, 3) and proposed
sales of any individual major defense equipment of $14
million or more [Ref . ll:pp. 14-15]
.
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
A condensed discussion of the FMS bureaucratic process
is provided below. When the USG receives a request for
21
significant military equipment (SME) , several basic
procedures must occur before the transaction is complete.
The request for SME must include justification of the need
for the equipment, the affect on the nation's force
structure, the neighboring country's expected reaction to
the purchase, the purchaser's ability to operate the
equipment, and the financial arrangements to be made for
payment. The Department of State's Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs (State PM) takes the request and may confer
with the requesting country's Bureau of Political Military
Affairs. Assuming that there are not any problems, the
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is given the go
ahead for the transaction. If the equipment must receive
Congressional review, the State PM first notifies Congress,
and then gives DSAA permission to proceed. [Ref. 12:pp. 7-
9]
After the initial request for the FMS purchase has been
received by the U.S., the purchaser may request planning and
review data (P&R) about the proposed equipment. The P&R
data is preliminary informational data that assists the
buyer in planning for receipt of the order upon approval.
In addition to P&R data, price and availability data (P&A)
may also be requested. P&A data is very specific it gives
precise estimates of the cost involved and the delivery
available. P&A data is ordinarily given to the purchaser
22
only when it is fairly certain the transaction will be
approved by the USG.
The document used to consummate the FMS is the LOA. The
LOA contains the exact price as well as the terms of the
sale, including any offset agreements. The LOA is routed
through the various agencies for approval by the DSAA
Operations Directorate (DSAA/OPS) . After State Department
review, the LOA goes to Congress if Congressional review is
required prior to approval. After final U.S. approval of
the sale, the buyer has 85 days to accept the LOA. [Ref.
12:pp. 11-13]
After acceptance of the LOA, procurement is handled in
the same manner as with any USG contract with a defense
contractor. The contractor sells the equipment to the US
government then the equipment is sold to the foreign
government at which time the USG is paid in accordance with
the LOA.
C. DIRECT SALES
U.S. defense contractors may sell directly to a foreign
buyer under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms
Regulation (ITAR) with the approval of the Office of
Munitions Control (OMC) . Any company or individual that
manufactures or exports defense articles or services is
required to register with OMC. OMC in turn coordinates the
request for permission to export defense articles and
services, as
23
defined by the United States Munitions list [Ref. 13:pp.
19-20]
.
A licence must be granted by OMC before defense articles
or services may be exported. If there is any doubt about
issuing an export license the reguest is sent to the State
Department for review. As with FMS, Congressional review is
necessary for any sales above the AECA's thresholds.
After approval by the appropriate government bodies, OMC
reguires the receiving country to sign an end user
certificate, and the export licence is issued. The buyer
and seller then conduct the business transaction.
D. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FMS AND COMMERCIAL SALES
The major difference between FMS and commercial sale is
the commercial sale is not administered by DOD and does not
involve a Government-to-Government agreement although the US
Government monitors the program activity.
E. F/A-18 OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS
This section will address the specific contract
arrangements and the offsets used on the F/A-18 strike
fighter. Canada selected the commercial program and
Australia and Spain selected the FMS procedure as a method
of buying the F/A-18. Each of the foreign purchases involve
an offset contract. All offset contracts (deeds) are
commercial arrangements between the purchasing government
and the contractors involved in the F/A-18 program. While
24
the U.S. Government is fully cognizant of the offset
agreements it is not a party to the offset agreements and
does not guarantee the favorable economic outcome of these
arrangements.
These deeds are comprised of three different and unique
offset categories, designated, co-production, and new
initiatives.
Designated offsets are articles and services
performed in the purchasing country associated with the
that country's own aircraft. (I.e., Spain manufactures
the horizontal stabilators for a EF-18 (Spanish)
aircraft.
)
Co-Production offsets are articles and services performed
in the purchasing country involving technology used or
similar to that accomplished for the designated work, but
for other than that country's aircraft. (I.e., Spain
manufactures the horizontal stabilators for other than
Spain's aircraft.) MCAIR has a policy that no more than
50% of the total program's requirement can be co-produced.
Figure 1 shows the F/A-18 co-production program.
New Initiatives are work (other than designated work
and Co-Production work) performed by the purchasing
country; this includes articles and services for non-
defense related projects, tourism development, and
export development.
The following sections provide a short synopsis of each
of the F/A-18 foreign sales and the offsets of each program.
F. CANADIAN (CF-18) PROGRAM
GENERAL—The Canadian government has contracted to
purchase 138 CF-18 aircraft. Deliveries started 4th quarter
of 1982 and will end in the 3rd quarter of 1988. The buy



























The contract is commercial contract (government to
contractor). The contract was signed in April 1980.
PROGRAM VALUE— $2,457 billion Canadian.
INDUSTRIAL BENEFIT VALUE— $2,453 billion Canadian
then-year dollars firm, $475 million then dollars
conditional. Firm commitments will be placed with Canadian
industry. The conditional F/A-18 work is now placed.








60% must be aerospace work
4 0% is the maximum non-aerospace
10% of non-aerospace is maximum allowable for tourism
development.
Technologies transfer shall be not less than 10% of
the aggregate.
• TIME PERIOD FOR I.B. PERFORMANCE—Industrial Benefits can
be accrued from March 1977 to December 1994. Performance
periods are divided into 3-year periods.
STATUS—Industrial Benefits are presently running well
ahead of schedule. The commitment at the end of the 3rd
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quarter of 1987 was $ 1.233 billion and MCAIR' s performance
is $ 1.998 billion.
• TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS—See Figure 2 (CF-18A/B
Industry Participation) Designated Work.
F/A-18 RELATED COMPONENTS CANADIAN SUPPLIER
Cruise Missile Guidance Litton Canada
Nose Barrel Canadair
Side Panels MCAIR Canada
Composite Doors Fleet Industries
Heads-up displays Litton Canada
Wire bundles MCAIR Canada
Engine guide vanes General Electric
INDUSTRIAL
MD-80 and KC-10 wings at MCAIR Canada
Production G.E. TV components
Establishment of a manufacturing technology center in
New Brunswick with McDonnell Douglas Automatic,
(computer aid design/computer aid manufacturing)
.
Tourism
G. AUSTRALIAN (F/A-18) PROGRAM
GENERAL—The Commonwealth of Australian (COA) contracted
to purchase 75 F/A18 aircraft. The first two aircraft were
fully assembled and delivered at MCAIR in St. Louis. The
remaining 73 aircraft (57 single and 16 dual seat) are
scheduled to be final assembled and accepted at the
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Figure 2. CF-18A/B Industry Part .cipation
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from GAF start in the 2nd quarter 1985 and will end in the
2nd quarter of 1990. This is a FMS arrangement. The LOA was
signed in December 1983.
• PROGRAM VALUE—$2,069 billion U.S. dollars.
• INDUSTRIAL BENEFIT VALUE—The industrial benefit value is
thirty percent (30%) of the import content. The credit






7 0% must be aerospace work
3 0% is the maximum non-aerospace work
10% of the non-aerospace is maximum allowable for
tourism development.
• TIME PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE—Industrial Benefits can be
accrued from December 1981 to seven years after the last
delivery of 75 aircraft for use by the Royal Australian Air
Force (RAAF)
.
STATUS—The Industrial Benefits are presently running
well ahead of schedule.
TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS—See Figure 3 (Australian
Industry Participation) Designated Work.
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Hornet Australian Co-Produce* Items
Hydraulic Reservolre
Fire & Bleed Air Leek Detection System
Trailing Edge Flap
Trailing Edge Flat Shroud
Bleed Air System Ducting
Air Conditioning System Cumpowsula
Canopy Assembly (F Only)












Aft Nozzle Faking Assemblies
Engines
Vent Tank Fuel Cell
Forward, Centre & Aft Engine Doors
Auxiliary Power Unit
Trailing Edge Flap Actuator
Aircraft Mounted Accessory Drive Gearbox
Variable Speed Constant Frequency Unit





*aln Wheel A Brake Assembly
M)i Landing Gear
Forward Fuselage Instaa |,.ons (Right & Left Avionics Bays)
Flight Control Computer
Stores ManageriHmt System
Communication {.ystem Control Set
IFF Set 1
Inertia! Navigatlfh System
Air Data Computar Power Supply
TACAN Receiver Transmitter
Flight Control Computer Power Supply
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Giromills Wind Power Generator
Tourism Development
H. SPANISH (EF-18) PROGRAM
GENERAL—The Spanish government has contracted to pur-
chase 72 EF-18 aircraft. Deliveries started in the 1st
quarter of 1986 and will end in the 2nd quarter of 1990.
The buy includes 60 single seat (EF-18A) and 12 two-seat EF
18B. This is a FMS arrangement. The LOA was signed May
1983.
• PROGRAM VALUE—$2,329 billion U.S. dollars.
• INDUSTRIAL BENEFIT VALUE— $1.8 billion U.S. then-year
dollars.




40% must be designated a co-production work
40% must involve "technology characteristic of
developed countries"
10% minimum "high technology" transfer
10% maximum in tourism
• TIME PERIOD FOR I.B. PERFORMANCE—Industrial Benefits can
be accrued from July 1982 to December 1993.
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STATUS—Industrial Benefits are presently running well
ahead of schedule. The commitment at the end of June 1987
was $248.6 million and MCAIR's performance is $278.9
million.
• TYPES OF INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS—See Figure 4 (Spanish
Industry Participation) Designated Work.
• EF-18 RELATED COMPONENTS SPANISH SUPPLIER
Leading Edge Extensions Construccioncs Aeronauticas
Inner Leading Edge Flap




Aft Fuselage Side Panels
Stores Mgmt Set & Comm
System Control Set
Head-Up Display & Multi-
purpose Display























































































































As stated previously, each of the countries pursues its
own specific strategic and economic objectives through an
offset program. Each has identified areas of emphasis to
meet specific needs.
Canada produces several major airframe components of the
F/A18 as well as avionic items. It also has considerable
work associated with McDonnell Douglas commercial aircraft
products. In addition, Canada grants credit in a number of
non-aerospace areas as a means of achieving opportunities or
economic goals.
Australia has very specific objectives for their
offset/industry participation program. It is seeking new
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technologies for the Australian aerospace industry and
wishes to establish an autonomous support capability for the
aircraft. Australia, unlike Spain and Canada, chose final
assembly and flyout in country. Although expensive,
Australia felt that the benefits gained for the cost were
justifiable relative to the development of support
capabilities and future aircraft programs. Australia has
little emphasis on the commercial offset opportunities.
Spain has followed a pattern very similar to that
adopted by Canada. A larger emphasis is on the commercial
aspects, principally because of Spain's economy. Spain does
build some F/A18 components but final assembly, flyout and
delivery is at McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis. As with the
other countries, Spain is meeting its objectives via its
offset program structure.
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IV. IMPACT ON THE F/A-18 DOMESTIC PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze the impact of the offset
agreements presented in Chapter III and will determine what
impact the agreements have on the domestic F/A-18 program.
The impacts of the offsets have been separated into three
categories: positive, negative, and perceived negative
impacts. Perceived negative impacts are impacts that have a
negative connotation however the research does not support
this perception. The chapter will address the impact of the
offsets in a management analysis manner from the perspective
of the Program Manager.
Before addressing the specific impacts of these offset
agreements there is one basic assumption that is key to the
analysis. In order to sell the F/A-18 Strike Fighter to the
foreign countries MCAIR had to enter into the offset
agreements presented in Chapter III. There are strong
competitors in the international defense aerospace industry
(General Dynamics F-16, Sweden's Viggen, France's Mirage).
If one bidder is willing to make such offset concessions
others will have to, unless their product is so unique that
there is no competition.
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B. POSITIVE IMPACTS
1. Lower Unit Production Costs
The major benefit that DOD has recognized from the
offset agreements is the lowering of the production unit
cost of a domestic F/A-18. DOD claims that the combined
foreign sales (both direct and FMS) has saved the U.S. Navy
$1.6 billion in acquisition costs [Ref. 14]. The following
efforts contribute most to this economic benefit:
- Recoupment of nonrecurring production cost and Research
& Development (RDT&E) expense which would have been
absorbed by the U.S. government in the absence of
foreign sales. Recoupment of these non recurring costs
are explicitly defined and are determined on a pro rate
basis according to published formulas.
- Production cost savings result from economies of scale
and increased production experience. Foreign orders may
increase a contract order to a volume that can be
manufactured more efficiently, or provide more





In principle the offset agreements have the
potential to increase the degree of competition for sub-
components. The offset agreements allow the foreign country
to manufacture components for their own aircraft as well as
for U.S. Navy and other international customers. If the
foreign manufacturer is competitive and is able to "ramp
up," MCAIR will have the benefit of dual sources (the
original U.S. manufacturer and the foreign manufacturer).
This benefit is somewhat limited as MCAIR has a policy that
limits the number of components manufactured outside of the
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United States to 50% of the total program production
quantity. In reality the foreign companies do not always
possess the technical expertise to "ramp up" and be compet-
itive so increased competition may not always result.
3
.
Increased Defense Industry Business and Employment
The U.S. defense industry business has increased
because of the offset agreements. From the perspective of
the U.S. companies, the question is not whether to accept a
deal with or without offsets. The question is between
business with offsets or no business at all. As a result of
increased industry business new jobs are created. Various
estimates have been reported on the relationship between
foreign sales and employment. The Secretary of Defense in
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
22 February 1983, emphasized the role military sales play in
creating jobs in the United States and increasing revenue
when he stated that:
A recent Bureau of Labor statistics study concluded that
annual foreign defense deliveries at levels ranging
between $5 billion and $10 billion require between two and
three hundred thousand jobs in the U.S private sector. As
the value of U.S. defense deliveries increase, as they
have in the past few years, the number of private sector
jobs also increase. These jobs cut across the economic
spectrum, although they are largely concentrated in
manufacturing
.
4 Increased Taxes Receipts
The sale of F/A-18 to foreign governments also
generates a significant inflow of funds to the United States
Treasury. The Wharton Annual Econometric Model indicates
40
that approximately 65 percent of the value of equipment
produced in the U.S. for sale to foreign customers
eventually flows into the U.S. Treasury in the form of tax
receipts [Ref. 15:p. 24]. This revenue comes from 48
percent tax applied to corporate profits of companies
engaged in foreign sales (less taxes paid to foreign
governments) and personal income taxes paid by stockholders
and industrial workers.
5 . Military Benefits
The foreign sales enable allied and friendly
countries to carry out missions in support of U.S. National
Security interests. Using foreign sales to strengthen NATO
forces allows European nations to assume greater
responsibility for their mutual defense which lessens the
need for U.S. forces in Europe. The first operational
Canadian squadron of CF-18's arrived in NATO in the summer
of 1985. The Spanish have been operating in Europe with EF-
18 's since the summer of 1986. The offsets also promote the
concept of Rationalization Standardization and
Interoperability (RSI) . While it would be more cost-
effective for foreign customers to buy complete systems the
offset agreements do achieve standardization through co-
production.
C. NEGATIVE IMPACTS
Although DOD has recognized a $1.6 billion savings as a
result of foreign purchases they are not without certain
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costs. The first cost is the additional program management
that is required to manage the offsets arrangements. The
other major cost is the additional risk the contractor and
DOD assume as part of the offset agreements.
1 . Program Management Cost
The offset agreements have dictated a new structure
for military system acquisitions. DOD has the
responsibility for the overall management of the F/A-18 FMS
acquisition programs through the U. S. Navy and its prime
contractors. In a commercial contract such as Canada's, DOD
is supportive and still involved to a limited extent in the
program affairs.
Although the offset programs are commercial
agreements, because of the interlocking relationships of
offset sales and deliveries, expanded program management is
required. This expanded management effort is principally
funded by the purchasing countries. However, there is a
hidden indirect labor cost that is absorbed by the U.S.
government. This hidden labor cost results from the
additional bureaucratic procedures, the extensive
communication problems, and the manufacturing problems
experienced by the foreign firms.
Each F/A-18 international program has two divisions
of operations. One is within the continental U.S. and one
is within the customer country. There are three elements of
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management involved: DOD, the U.S. contractors and customer
country government and industry sectors.
DOD has the overall management responsibility for
the F/A-18 program through the U.S. Navy and the prime
contractors. The U.S. Navy, through the Chief of Naval
Operations, ensures the implementation and program execution
for the FMS cases and supports the direct commercial sales.
The Naval Supply Systems Command has the responsibility for
supervision, policy and coordination with the other systems
commands to insure proper distribution of funds. Detailed
program management for the U.S. Navy is completed through
the F/A-18 Program Office (PMA-265) located in Naval Air
Systems Command. PMA-2 65 has ten full time government
employees to manage the three foreign programs plus a cadre
of contractor support services personnel. All the
government employees and the contractor support personnel
are charged to the foreign countries.
The standard organization and management structure
is altered at the Naval Plant Representative Office
(NAVPRO) . Because of the offset programs and the type of
sales, the responsibilities of the NAVPRO require additional
task assignments.
For Canada, the NAVPRO offices at the prime
contractors serve for the Canadian government to ensure that
the products delivered to the Canadian Forces fulfill the
specifications, quality standards and schedules. Canada and
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the U.S. government have Defense Sharing Production
Agreement. This agreement allows Canadian quality assurance
teams to monitor and inspect products to ensure that U.S.
standards and requirements are met. Therefore, there is no
NAVPRO office located in Canada.
As previously mentioned in Chapter III, Australia is
performing final assembly and fly-out of 73 of their 75
aircraft. In addition, Australia is manufacturing a
significant number of components for their aircraft and for
U.S. Navy and other international customers. A NAVPRO
office has been established in Melbourne, Australia to
ensure that the aircraft delivered to the Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF) by the U.S. government meet the
specifications, quality standards and performance as those
for the U.S. Navy. No government-to-government production
agreement such as the one for Canada exists between the two
countries so the NAVPRO office will remain in country for
the offset activity support. The NAVPRO employs
approximately 25 U.S. government employees. The cost of
operating the NAVPRO in Melbourne is borne by the
Commonwealth of Australia (COA)
.
Spain is very much involved in offset activity.
Many similar contract administrative support needs such as
those in Australia also exist with Spain. NAVAIR has
assigned contract administration functions to the (NAVPRO)
at MCAIR. Detachment 19, U.S. Air Force Contract
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Maintenance Center (AFCMC) , located at Construccioncs
Aeronautics S.A. (CASA) , in Madrid is currently identified
as the responsible office for contract administration in
Spain. Currently, the AFCMC has nine people dedicated to
the EF-18 program. This support will continue to be billed
directly to Spain for as long as the offset activity exists.
MCAIR management is organized under a single Vice
President and General Manager reporting directly to the
President. There are respective program managers that
report to the Deputy General Manager who is tasked with
responsibility for the F/A-18 International Program. Each
program manager has personnel assigned to him from the
various functional divisions. MCAIR has provided offices in
Melbourne, Australia and Madrid, Spain because of the co-
production effort. These offices are staffed with personnel
from the functional divisions for in country support and
administration. The cost of support by these offices is
directly charged to the respective country.
MCAIR has also established an International Division
of approximately 50 people to help negotiate, coordinate and
conduct offset operations. The majority of this effort is
to monitor the production schedules of both direct and
indirect offset work. This division is charged to an
international overhead pool and not to the U.S. government.
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2 . Increased Program Risk
The other negative impact is the increased risk that
is directly assumed by MCAIR and indirectly by the U.S.
government. These increased risks are primarily the result
of the different business environments and the different
cultural work values. Consequently, the increased risk
associated of the offsets with Canada are minimum and are
not addressed below.
If the offset initiative involves a standard
technology and low rate production effort the work has a
high probability of success. The "designated" work
generally involves production of only one and one-half units
per month. Most of this work is not meeting purchase order
delivery yet, but the U.S. companies have built in a
sufficient float to accommodate this situation. Technical
and managerial assistance has been required in most cases to
develop this production capability.
A few of the designated programs involve
significantly newer technology which increases the program
risk. In these cases direct and forceful intervention by
MCAIR or the respective U.S. contractor is required. The
prime cannot hold the foreign company accountable as it
would in the U.S. A paternal, guiding, on-site management
effort is required. While action is being taken to
encourage the foreign contractor to correct the situation,
MCAIR has little direct leverage until the problem clearly
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threaten purchase order deliveries. Since foreign firms
generally tend to resist American's advice, attempting to
keep them on track is a frustrating problem.
The co-production program is at least a medium to
high program risk. Foreign contractors have to be
competitive to receive work. This means that they will have
to overcome some inherent inefficiencies and operate in
accordance with detailed management plans. A favorable
outcome is possible, but it will reguire some relatively
large changes in attitude and behavior of the firms
involved. The one thing that makes this prospect attainable
is that the majority of the co-production work is
concentrated in a few larger projects.
The following examples illustrate the nature of this
additional program risk assumed and how this risk impacts
MCAIR and DOD.
The Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) , in
Melbourne has a large potential workload for engine access
doors worth nearly $200 million. The technology is not
exotic and management has made a strong commitment to become
competitive. The labor unions and their clout make them
less efficient then they could be, however their labor rates
are substantially below the U.S. manufacturer—Northrop
Corporation. These factors balance to some degree, but they
still need to work at being more efficient. CAC has been
delivering at a low rate for nearly a year and they have yet
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to deliver on schedule. Because of the late delivery, CAC
must bear the additional expense of air shipment instead of
the planned surface shipment rate. The late delivery has
significantly disrupted MCAIR's assembly line as the engine
doors must be added on out of station. CAC has a projected
production rate of 8 ship sets per month. If CAC doesn't
achieve this rate they probably will not be competitive.
MCAIR and Navy management have spent a large number of
manhours managing this problem to insure that CAC's poor
performance doesn't result in the late delivery of U.S. Navy
aircraft.
The next example involves a higher technology
—
composite bonding for the horizontal stabilizers.
Construccioncs Aeronautics, S.A. (CASA) is scheduled to
participate in the manufacturing of this advanced composite
technology. CASA has little experience with the
manufacturing of advanced primary structure composites. It
is unlikely that MCAIR can transfer 15-20 years of extensive
hands-on composite experience to a level sufficient to
guarantee a quality product. CASA has had an extremely
difficult time manufacturing these horizontal stabilizers
and MCAIR has had to substantially reduce CASA's production
rate and bring most of the work back in house. A task that
took MCAIR 400 hours took CASA 2,000 hours [Ref. 16]. This
resulted in a tremendous workload increase at MCAIR. This
unscheduled work and the incorporation of a major
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configuration change put MCAIR at least two weeks behind
management's schedule. In the month of August 1987 MCAIR had
dozens of production engineers scurrying around trying to
figure out how to get back on schedule.
The final example involves labor problems associated
with the transition of the Government Aircraft Factories
(GAF) to Aerospace Technologies of Australia (ASTA) . GAF is
the subcontractor to MCAIR for final assembly and ramp of
the F/A-18 being produced for the RAAF. GAF has a long
history of inefficiency and industrial disputes. Last year
GAF required a $10,000 government subsidy for each of the
2,000 civil service employees in order to maintain financial
solvency [Ref. 17:p. 1]
.
In July 1986 the COA decided it wanted to reorganize
the GAF, to operate as a commercial corporation, following
the British model. On 14 August 1987, ASTA executed a 518
employee reduction in force in order to reduce their
overheads so that ASTA would become commercially viable.
This caused a strike by most white and all blue collar
workers. The unions (a total of 17) demanded that all 518
workers (110 blue collar and 408 white collar) be taken back
before they would return to work. As of the end August 1987
ASTA was currently six aircraft behind schedule with program
milestones slipping daily [Ref. 18:p. 1]
.
The solution to this problem depends on whether the
COA wants the aircraft delivered to operational squadrons
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when originally planned or whether to keep planned work in
Australia. The two appear to be mutually exclusive. If the
work is to remain in Australia the impact is minimum. It
could be a simple country to country agreement to exercise
continued patience in hope of improved GAF/ASTA production
performance. If the delivery requirements are firm then the
U.S. Navy could arrange for production shortfall and
schedule recovery to be produced at MCAIR and reschedule the
co-production program to reflect ASTA production capability.
This is a very politically sensitive topic and falls outside
the scope of this paper. The best U.S. Navy course of
action would be to determine Australia's needs and direct
the FMS program to fulfill those needs, providing no
increased cost to the U.S. government occurred.
D. PERCEIVED NEGATIVE IMPACTS
1 . Technology Transfer and Competitiveness
Concern is often expressed that technology
transferred through offset agreements will be used by the
purchasing country not only in the immediate program, but
ultimately to produce products that will compete with
similar U.S. products. U.S. companies are very aware that
technology transfer can create future competition. This is
not a major problem.
What the U.S. companies are really transferring is
production technology that may be state of the art.
Production technology has a limited life. When new it is
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very expensive, and when obsolete it can't be given away.
The competitive companies within the aerospace industry are
aware of the importance of maintaining a technological edge
over the competition. They recognize that in order to
remain competitive they must not only know the current
technology, but have better technologies under development.
By the time technology is made available, the U.S firm is
certain to be using even newer technology.
2 . Erosion of Industrial Base
The claim is also made that offsets tend to involve
shifting work from U.S. subcontractors and vendors to their
oversees counterparts. To some degree this may be true and
might result in an actual decline in the industrial base.
The results of the ITC study referenced in Chapter II failed
to link offsets to any decline in a specific industry. The
major problem in determining the erosion of the industrial
base is obtaining the relevant data. There are a few dozen
major defense companies which account for most of the prime
contractors and the majority of subcontractors. However,
there are thousands of lower tier subcontractors that have
some interest in defense business.
For example the F/A-18 has roughly 10,000
subcontractors and vendors involved in its production [Ref.
19]. Undoubtedly, among those 10,000 suppliers are some
who would get more business if it were not for offsets,
assuming that sales of the F/A-18 were made at all. More
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importantly, there are other vendors who are not providing
parts for the F/A-18 who might have been able to if not for
the offsets. The problem is finding subcontractors who
don't have a job but might have and deciding whether it is
because of the offset agreements or because of performance,
price or quality problems. The potential for this problem




Offsets are a way of life. They are rapidly becoming a
condition of sale in most international programs. The F/A-
18 contractors are not unique in using these offset
concessions as a marketing tool.
The reasons for countries requiring offsets vary. In
general, they are usually associated with strategic and
economic objectives. The strategic objectives may be to
gain new technologies or to build up an aerospace industry.
From an economic standpoint countries are trying to gain
entry into new markets, to provide jobs, and acquire
commercial technologies.
These foreign governments are similar to the U.S.
government in that they must protect the public trust.
Consequently, they feel a need to demonstrate to their
public that they have obtained the best possible deal in
terms of price, jobs, sales of domestic products, and
technology transfer. The U.S. government faces many of the
same political pressures. Congress adds a number of
additional requirements on defense contractors. Companies
are required to establish small business, minority business,
affirmative action programs, leader-follower programs, and
follow accounting practices peculiar to DOD requirements.
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In other words, the U.S. government wants more for its money
than just the defense hardware.
The impact of the of the offsets on the F/A-18 domestic
program have varied. While the U.S. Navy has realized a
$1.6 billion saving in the acquisition costs there are some
externalities that need to be considered.
The positive externalities include: increased defense
business, increased competition, generated tax receipts, and
military benefits such as rationalization, standardization
and interoperability (RSI) . What is more important is that
each country gets a sophisticated aircraft that it would not
have been able to afford without offsets.
The negative externalities of the offsets have been
minimal. While monitoring and administration of the program
has been extensive and sometimes frustrating most of the
increased costs are passed on to the foreign customer. The
other cost is the additional risk that the contractor and to
some extent DOD assumes when entering into these agreements.
Although the offset concessions are commercial arrangements
between the prime contractor and the foreign government,
they have occasionally disrupted the assembly line causing
out of station work to be done. In addition, there is the
potential of the offsets affecting the delivery schedule of
the domestic F/A-18 although this is very unlikely.
To summarize, offsets are a fact of life in the
international market place: one that doesn't have a serious
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negative impact on the F/A-18 program or on the U.S.
economy.
This view is not universally shared. U.S.
Representative Barbara B. Kennelly, D-Conn, believes that
offsets will seriously affect our national and economic
security. She has introduced a bill, H.R. 1652 which calls
"for multilateral negotiations to discipline the practice of
offsets" [Ref. 20:p. 1] . These negotiations would involve
the Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of Defense. Because of the little documented data
on the effects of offsets, the controversy on the issue will
probably increase as the demand for the offsets increase.
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